巴菲特致股东的信（2014年）附录三：副董事长的思考过去和未来

Vice Chairman’s Thoughts – Past and Future

副董事长的思考过去和未来

To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦所有股东：

I closely watched the 50-year history of Berkshire’s uncommon success under Warren Buffett. And it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement whatever celebratory comment comes from him. I will try to do five things.

我近距离地观察了伯克希尔过去50 年在沃伦·巴菲特领导下不同寻常的成功。现在看上去是合适的时候，让我独立地补充，不论他本人会做出何种的纪念性评论。我将尝试着做5 件事情：

(1) Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,

1，描述其管理体系和政策，使得一家注定失败的小型纺织品企业，转变成现在强大的伯克希尔。

(2) Explain how the management system and policies came into being,

2，解释管理体系和政策是如何形成。

(3) Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,

3，在某种程度上解释为什么伯克希尔做得如此之好。

(4) Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and

4，如果巴菲特很快卸任，预测不同寻常的好结果是否会保持。

(5) Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

5，思考伯克希尔过去50 年取得的巨大成就是否对其他地方有所启示。

The management system and policies of Berkshire under Buffett (herein together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and are described below:

巴菲特领导下的伯克希尔的管理体系和政策(这里统称"伯克希尔体系")很早就固定下来，描述如下：

(1) Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions. (2) Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy. (3) There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc. (4) Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment. (5) There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different. (6) Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.

1，伯克希尔将是一个多元化的企业集团，它仅会拒绝那些无法做出令人满意预测的业务类型。2，母公司几乎所有的业务，都将通过独立子公司运营，这些子公司CEO 们将会拥有极大自主权。3，企业集团的总部几乎没有任何东西，只有一个小办公室套间，一位董事长，一位CFO 以及数位助手，他们主要帮助CFO 进行审计，内部控制等工作。4，伯克希尔子公司总是把财产意外险公司放在显著地位置上。这些保险子公司作为一个集团，预计将适时产生可靠的承保收益，同时产生大量的"浮存金"(来自未支付的保险负债)用于投资。5，不会有显著的系统性的人事制度，股票期权制度，其他激励制度，退休制度等，因为子公司将有他们自己的制度，而各个子公司之间的制度通常是不同的。6，伯克希尔的董事长只会为自己保留很少的工作：

(i) He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.

ⅰ，他将管理几乎所有的证券投资，这些投资通常放在伯克希尔的保险子公司中。

(ii) He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.

ⅱ，他将任命所有重要子公司的CEO，并确定他们的报酬标准，并从每个人那里获得继任者的私人推荐人选，以防突然需要继任者。

(iii) He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.

ⅲ，在子公司增强其竞争优势之后，他将配置子公司富余的大部分现金，理想的配置是使用这些现金去收购新的子公司。

(iv) He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.

ⅳ，如果子公司CEO 有任何需要，他将立即能够被直接联络到，几乎不需要额外的渠道。

(v) He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.

ⅴ，他将在他的年度报告中撰写长篇的，有逻辑的，有用的信件。如果他只是一个被动持有的股东，他会希望这封信是什么样子。并且他将能花几小时的时间，在年度股东大会上回答股东的问题。

(vi) He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.

ⅵ，他将努力成为一种文化的典范。这种文化将在很长一段时间为客户、股东和其他在职者提供良好的服务，无论在他卸任前后都是如此。

(vii) His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularly that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and

ⅶ，他的首要任务将是预留大量时间安静地阅读和思考，特别是那些可能提高他的决策的学习，不论他变得多老。

(viii) He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing.

ⅷ，他将花费许多时间热情地欣赏他人所取得的成就。

(7) New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.

7，新的子公司将通常用现金收购，而不是新发行的股票。

(8) Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.

8，只要每一美元的留存收益能够为股东创造多于一美元的市场价值，伯克希尔就不会支付股息。

(9) In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.

9，在收购新子公司时，伯克希尔将寻求以合理的价格购买一家董事长能够完全理解的好生意。伯克希尔还希望被收购公司拥有一位优秀的CEO，他有望长期留任，并能在不需要总部帮助的情况下，很好地管理公司。

(10) In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.

10，在选择子公司的CEO 时，伯克希尔将努力确保其有诚信，有才能，有活力并热爱其所在企业和环境。

(11) As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.

11，作为重要的优先行为，伯克希尔将几乎永远不会出售子公司。

(12) Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.

12，伯克希尔几乎不会将子公司的CEO 调配到其他不相关子公司任职。

(13) Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.

13，伯克希尔永远不会仅仅因为年龄问题就迫使子公司的CEO 退休。

(14) Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.

14，伯克希尔将几乎没有未清偿债务，因为它试图保持：(i)在任何状况下几乎完美的信誉；(ii)当出现不同寻常的机会的时候，容易获得可以调配的现金和信贷。

(15) Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.

15，伯克希尔总是对潜在的大公司的卖家很友好。提供这样的业务将快速获得伯克希尔的报价。如果此报价没有促成交易的话，除了董事长和伯克希尔的一两个人，没人会知道这个提议。并且他们将永远不会将此事告诉局外人。

Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size are quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.

伯克希尔体系的要素和它们聚集的规模都是如此不同寻常。据我所知，没有任何一家大型企业具备这种要素的一半。

How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so different from the norm?

伯克希尔是如何恰好拥有一个如此与众不同的企业性格的呢？

Well, Buffett, even when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire’s shares and was completely trusted by all the other big shareholders. He could install whatever system he wanted. And he did so, creating the Berkshire system.

嗯，巴菲特，即使当年仅有34 岁就控制了伯克希尔约45％的股份，并且完全被其他大股东所信任。他能够建立任何他所想要的系统。并且他也做到了，他创造了伯克希尔体系。

Almost every element was chosen because Buffett believed that, under him, it would help maximize Berkshire’s achievement. He was not trying to create a one-type-fits-all system for other corporations. Indeed, Berkshire’s subsidiaries were not required to use the Berkshire system in their own operations. And some flourished while using different systems.

几乎每个要素的选择，都是因为巴菲特相信，在他的领导下，它将有助于伯克希尔成就的最大化。他并没有试图为其他的企业创造一个都适用的系统。事实上，伯克希尔的子公司们并不需要在自己的运营中使用伯克希尔的系统。而且即使采用不同的系统，一些公司也很繁盛。

What was Buffett aiming at as he designed the Berkshire system?

巴菲特设计伯克希尔体系的时候的目标是什么？

Well, over the years I diagnosed several important themes:

嗯，这些年来我总结出几个重要的因素：

(1) He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself. (2) He wanted win/win results everywhere--in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance. (3) He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions. (4) He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters. (5) He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.

1，他特别希望从他自己开始，不断最大限度地发挥体系中最重要人员的理性，技能和奉献精神。2，他希望在任何地方都能取得双赢的结果，比如说，用忠诚待人的方式来获得忠诚。3，他希望做出最大化长期结果的决策，通常从任职时间足够长并承担决策后果的决策者那里寻求答案。4，他希望尽最大限度地减少来自总部庞大官僚机构几乎不可避免的负面影响。5，他希望像本杰明格雷厄姆教授那样，亲自为传播智慧做出贡献。

When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all the benefits that followed? No. Buffett stumbled into some benefits through practice evolution. But, when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes.

当巴菲特开发伯克希尔体系的时候，他是否预见到了所有后来发生的好处？并没有。巴菲特通过不断实践的进化，偶然获得了一些好处。但是，当他看到有用的结果时，他强化了它们的成因。

Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well?

为什么伯克希尔在巴菲特的领导下表现得如此出色？

Only four large factors occur to me:

我只想到四大因素：

(1) The constructive peculiarities of Buffett, (2) The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system, (3) Good luck, and (4) The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press. I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.

1，巴菲特自身的建设性特质。2，伯克希尔体系的建设性特质。3，好运气。4，一些股东和其他崇拜者(包括一些媒体人士)，异常强烈且富有传染性的忠诚。我相信这四个因素都存在且都有帮助。但是沉重的负担是由建设性的特质，不寻常的忠诚，和他们的互动关系所承载的。

In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good at tennis.

特别是巴菲特决定将他的业务类型限定于少数几类，并最大限度地专注于这些业务，并坚持这样做了50 年，这是一个lollapalooza 效应的结果。巴菲特的成功和Roger Federer 成为网球高手的原因是一样的。

Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.

事实上，巴菲特使用了著名篮球教练JohnWooden 的赢球方法。Wooden 在学会将所有的上场时间分配给他最好的七名球员之后，经常获胜。采用这种方式，对手总是面对他最好的球员，而不是次最好的。并且，随着额外的上场时间，最好的球员比正常情况下提升更多。

And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.

而巴菲特的情况远远超越了Wooden，因为在他的情况下，技能的练习集中于一个人而不是七个，50 年来随着年龄的增长，他的技能不断提升，而不是像篮球运动员那样不断退化。

Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.

此外，通过将如此多才华和权力集中在重要子公司长期任职的CEO 身上，巴菲特也创造了强大的Wooden式效应。并且此类效应提高了CEO 的技能和子公司的业绩。

Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.

然后，随着伯克希尔体系授予更多子公司及其CEO所渴望的自主权，以及伯克希尔变得成功且著名，这些结果吸引更多更好的子公司和更好的CEO，加入到伯克希尔大家庭。

And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”

而更好的子公司和CEO 需要总部更少的关注，这创造了一个通常被称为"良性循环"的局面。

How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?

伯克希尔将财产意外险公司作为重要的子公司的结果有多好？

Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.

不可思议地好。伯克希尔的雄心是无比强烈，即使如此，它依然得偿所愿。

Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.

财产意外险公司通常投资于价值与股东权益相当的普通股，伯克希尔保险子公司皆是如此。在过去50 年里，标普500 指数每年提供约10％的税前收益，创造了重要的推力。

And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.

并且，在巴菲特时代早期的几十年里，伯克希尔保险子公司内的普通股表现大幅地超越指数，正如巴菲特所期待的那样。后来，当伯克希尔庞大的持股规模和税收考虑，导致超越指数部分的回报变得不再重要时(或许不是永远如此)，其他更好的优势出现了。阿吉特·贾因从零开始创造了一个庞大的再保险公司，产生了巨量的"浮存金"和大量的承保收益。整个GEICO 保险并入了伯克希尔，随后GEICO 的市场份额提高为原来的四倍。还有，其他的伯克希尔保险业务也大幅度地提高，这主要得益于企业的声誉优势，承保纪律，寻找并留在良好的利基市场，并招募和留住优秀的人才。

Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.

后来，随着伯克希尔几乎独特且相当可靠的企业个性和庞大的规模，变得广为人知，它的保险子公司获得并抓住了许多其他公司无法获得的有吸引力的机会，去购买非公开发行的有价证券。这些有价证券的大多数具有固定的到期期限，并产生良好的投资回报。

Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.

伯克希尔在保险领域取得的惊人成绩并非天生的。通常情况下，即使管理得当，意外险业务也会取得平庸的业绩。这样的业绩几乎没有什么助益。伯克希尔的更好业绩是如此惊人地巨大，以至于我认为，如果巴菲特现在回到一个小公司重新开始，都难以再次创造它，纵使巴菲特保持他的智慧并且恢复年轻。

Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.

伯克希尔因为成为多元化的企业集团而遭遇困境了吗？没有，更广泛的业务范围，有效的扩大了它的投资机会。并且，巴菲特的技能避免了其他地方常见的负面影响。

Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.

为什么伯克希尔倾向于用现金购买公司，而不是自己的股票？嗯，很难用任何其他东西来换取伯克希尔的股票，这些东西的价值无法和放弃的伯克希尔股票一样高。

Why did Berkshire’s acquisition of companies outside the insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for shareholders of the acquirer?

为什么伯克希尔收购的非保险业务对伯克希尔的股东来说效果非常好，而通常此类收购对于其他收购方的股东而言却不利？

Well, Berkshire, by design, had methodological advantages to supplement its better opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor. And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one.

嗯，从收购设计上来说，伯克希尔有方法论上的优势，以补充它更好的机会。它从未在像"收购部门"那样在压力下进行收购。并且它从不依赖于"顾问"的建议，那些建议肯定会对交易产生偏见。而且巴菲特从不盲目自信，正如他过度低估了自己的专业知识，而他比大多数公司高管更清楚什么在商业中有效，什么无效，这得益于他作为一个被动投资者的长期经验。最后，即使伯克希尔获得了比其他公司更好的机会，巴菲特也经常表现出异于常人的耐心等待，很少购买。举例说来，在控制伯克希尔的前十年里，他看着一个公司(纺织)走向死亡，两家新公司进入，净增一家公司。

What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.

在巴菲特的领导下，伯克希尔犯了哪些重大错误？嗯，虽然主动犯下的错误很常见，但几乎所有巨大的错误都是没有购买，包括没有购买沃尔玛的股票，而这笔投资肯定会非常成功。错过的错误非常重要的。如果伯克希尔抓住几次机会，其账面价值至少会多出500 亿美元，但它还不足够聪明，无法将其视为几乎确定的事情。

The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart. The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.

在我清单上倒数第二项任务是：预测如果巴菲特很快离开，伯克希尔是否会继续取得不同寻常的好业绩。答案是肯定的。伯克希尔在其子公司中拥有许多基于长期竞争优势的商业势头。

Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise “bolt-on” acquisitions.

另外，其铁路和公用事业子公司在新的固定资产投资上提供大量令人满意的机会。而且其旗下许多子公司正在进行明智的"补强式"并购。

Provided that most of the Berkshire system remains in place, the combined momentum and opportunity now present is so great that Berkshire would almost surely remain a better-than-normal company for a very long time even if (1) Buffett left tomorrow, (2) his successors were persons of only moderate ability, and (3) Berkshire never again purchased a large business.

如果大部分的伯克希尔体系仍保持原样，那么现在所展现的势头和机会是如此巨大，以至于即使(1)巴菲特明天离开；(2)他的继任者都是能力平庸的人；(3)伯克希尔不再收购大型企业，伯克希尔也将几乎肯定会在很长一段时间内优于一般的企业。

But, under this Buffett-soon-leaves assumption, his successors would not be “of only moderate ability.” For instance, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel are proven performers who would probably be under-described as “world-class.” “World-leading” would be the description I would choose. In some important ways, each is a better business executive than Buffett.

但是，在这个巴菲特很快离开的假设之下，他的继任者不会是"仅有平庸能力"的人。例如，Ajit Jain 和Greg Abel 是已经证明他们表现的人，他们的表现可能将会被低估的描述为"世界级"。如果让我选择描述，我会用"世界领先"。在一些重要的方面，他们中每一个都是比巴菲特更好的企业管理者。

And I believe neither Jain nor Abel would (1) leave Berkshire, no matter what someone else offered or (2) desire much change in the Berkshire system.

并且我相信Jain 和Abel 都不会(1)离开伯克希尔，不论其他人开价如何；(2)希望伯克希尔体系大幅改变。

Nor do I think that desirable purchases of new businesses would end with Buffett’s departure. With Berkshire now so large and the age of activism upon us, I think some desirable acquisition opportunities will come and that Berkshire’s $60 billion in cash will constructively decrease.

我也不认为，对新企业的理想收购将会随着巴菲特的离开而结束。鉴于伯克希尔规模如此庞大，以及激进投资主义时代到来，我认为一些理想的收购机会将会来到，并且伯克希尔的600 亿美元现金将有益地减少。

My final task was to consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

我最后的一项任务是思考，伯克希尔过去50 年取得的巨大成绩是否对其他方面有所助益。

The answer is plainly yes. In its early Buffett years, Berkshire had a big task ahead: turning a tiny stash into a large and useful company. And it solved that problem by avoiding bureaucracy and relying much on one thoughtful leader for a long, long time as he kept improving and brought in more people like himself.

答案显然是肯定的。在巴菲特的早期，伯克希尔面临一个艰巨的任务：将一个小笔资金变成一个巨大而有用的企业。它通过避免官僚主义和长期依赖一位深思熟虑的领导人的方式，解决了这个问题，因为他不断改进，并且吸引了更多像他一样的人。

Compare this to a typical big-corporation system with much bureaucracy at headquarters and a long succession of CEOs who come in at about age 59, pause little thereafter for quiet thought, and are soon forced out by a fixed retirement age.

相比之下，典型的大公司体系中，总部有很多官僚机构，CEO 在大约59 岁入职，此后很少停下来安静思考，且很快因固定的退休年龄而被迫离职。

I believe that versions of the Berkshire system should be tried more often elsewhere and that the worst attributes of bureaucracy should much more often be treated like the cancers they so much resemble. A good example of bureaucracy fixing was created by George Marshall when he helped win World War II by getting from Congress the right to ignore seniority in choosing generals.

我相信，伯克希尔体系的版本应该被其他地方更频繁地尝试，官僚主义最糟糕特征应该更频繁地被像癌症般对待。George Marshall 创造了一个修正官僚主义的好例子，当时他从国会获得了无视资历选择将军的权力，从而帮助赢得了二战。

Sincerely,

谨此陈辞

Charles T. Munger

查理·芒格